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A B S T R A C T
Estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental changes have been highly instrumental
in the ever-increasing attention given to environmental migration in the media. Yet no consensual
estimate exists, let alone a commonly agreed methodology. As a result, predictions and estimates have
become one of the most contentious issues in the debates on environmental migration. This article seeks
to review the key estimates and predictions existing in the literature, as well as the methodologies they
are built on, and the problems and caveats they are fraught with. The ﬁrst part reviews the ﬁgures related
to current estimates of people displaced by environmental changes, while a second part examines the
predictions for future displacements. The next section synthesises the key methodological difﬁculties
and a ﬁnal section suggests some possible avenues for improvement.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmen-
tal changes have been highly instrumental in the ever-increasing
attention given to environmental migration in the media. Figures
ranging from tens of million people to a billion were to be found
not only in the headlines of the mainstream press, but also in
ofﬁcial communications and research reports. The current interest
for the topic is not only due to the speciﬁc nature of these
migration ﬂows, but also due to their potential magnitude.
Yet no consensual estimate exists, let alone a commonly agreed
methodology. As a result, predictions and estimates have become
one of the most contentious issues in the debates on environmen-
tal migration. Numerous authors have criticised the existing
estimates as artiﬁcially inﬂated, excessively alarmist, or ‘gues-
stimates’ (Kolmannskog, 2008). Crisp notes that ‘while all of the
standard works on refugees are replete with numbers, few even
begin to question the source or accuracy of those statistics’ (1999):
the remark applies to many works on environmental migration, as
most of them reproduce previous statistics, without conducting
any critical assessment of these data.* Correspondence address: Institute for Sustainable Development and Interna-
tional Relations (IDDRI), Sciences Po, 27 Rue Saint Guillaume, 75337 Paris Cedex 07,
France. Tel.: +33 1 45 49 76 79; fax: +33 1 45 49 76 85.
E-mail addresses: Francois.Gemenne@iddri.org, F.Gemenne@ulg.ac.be.
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0959-3780/$ – see front matter  2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.005This article aims to ﬁll in this gap by presenting key estimates
and predictions existing in the literature, as well as the
methodologies they are built on. It was initially commissioned
as a methodological review for the Foresight Project on Global
Environmental Migration, a project of the UK Government Ofﬁce
for Science aimed at assembling and analysing the latest evidence
and research on global environmental migration.1
For each estimate and prediction, the article provides an
assessment of the robustness of its methodology, its predictive
value, as well as its impacts in the public debates. The paper is
divided into four sections: the ﬁrst section reviews the estimates of
people currently displaced by environmental change that exist in
both the academic and grey literatures – the latter being deﬁned as
the works emanating from civil society and advocacy organisa-
tions. A second section examines the predictions that have been
made regarding the number of people who could be – or would be
– displaced by environmental changes in the future. These include
predictions made in the past with regard to a time horizon that has
since been passed. A third section synthesises some of the common
difﬁculties, weaknesses and shortcomings of the estimates and
predictions, and suggests some possible ways forward. Finally, a
fourth and ﬁnal section outlines some possible ways forward in
order to provide more robust ﬁgures. It should be noted that the
review focuses on global estimates and forecasts, and does not1 More information on the project can be found online at http://www.bis.gov.uk/
foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-environmental-migration.
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speciﬁc event.
2. Estimates of past and current migration ﬂows
There are far fewer works that attempt to count the actual
number of people displaced by environmental change than works
that aim to predict future migration ﬂows. One of the most cited
works on the subject, a report commissioned by UNEP in 1985 to
Egyptian scholar Hassam El-Hinnawi, gave birth to the ﬁgure of
30 million of displaced people (Milan, 2004; El-Hinnawi, 1985).
This ﬁgure, along with others provided by the Red Cross and
environmental scientist Norman Myers, will be repeated in
numerous reports and articles, sometimes inaccurately.
El-Hinnawi deﬁned ‘environmental refugees’ as those people
who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or
permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural
and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or
seriously affected the quality of their life (1985: 4). This very wide
deﬁnition encompasses both internal and international migration,
as well as temporary and permanent migration. The deﬁnition
however, focuses on forced displacement, and does not address
mobility as such. It addresses all types of environmental changes,
and not only those induced by climate change. The deﬁnition was
vividly criticised because of its large scope: amongst others, Bates
notes that this deﬁnition makes no distinction between refugees who
ﬂee volcanic eruptions and those who gradually leave their homes as
soil quality declines. So many people can be classiﬁed under the
umbrella of ‘environmental refugees’ that critics question the
usefulness of the concept (2002: 466).
In a 2004 interview, El-Hinnawi notes that 30 million people
were in this situation (Milan, 2004). This number, however, is
provided without a mention of the methodology used to produce it.
One can therefore cast serious doubts about the robustness of the
estimate and question its scientiﬁc validity. Though the number is
a global estimate and doesn’t distinguish between different types
of environmental migration, El-Hinnawi had previously attempted
to put forward a typology of environmental migration, comprising
the following categories:
- Those who had been temporarily displaced because of an
environmental stress (usually a natural disaster).
- Those who had to be permanently displaced and resettled in a
new area.
- Finally, those who migrated within their own national bound-
aries because ‘the resource base in their original habitat (had)
deteriorated to such a degree that it (could) no longer meet their
basic needs’ (1985: 4).
These three types of migrants no longer maintain the classical
distinction between forced and voluntary migrants, thus allowing
for an inﬂation of the numbers of so-called ‘refugees’.
This estimate was followed by another one, produced three
years later by Jodi Jacobsen in a paper of the WorldWatch Institute,
an inﬂuential Washington-based environmental think-tank, led by
environmentalist Lester Brown (Jacobson, 1988). Jacobson pro-
posed a typology similar to that put forward by El-Hinnawi,
distinguishing between temporary displacements associated with
temporary environmental stress, permanent displacements asso-
ciated with permanent environmental stress, and temporary or
permanent displacement due to progressive environmental
change (Jacobson, 1988: 5). This typology, however, was ﬂawed
by undue emphasis on the time frame of the displacement, at the
expense of other important variables, such as the degree of
coercion of the migration, or the distance travelled from the point
of origin. There was little distinction made between forced andPlease cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011voluntary migration. In a fashion similar to El-Hinnawi, Jacobson
vaguely deﬁned ‘environmental refugees’ as ‘people ﬂeeing from
environmental decline’ (1988: 6). Her report identiﬁed some
regions where environmental displacements were to take place,
sub-Saharan Africa and coastal regions of South-East Asia in
particular. She estimated the number of people displaced because
of environmental reasons at 10 million worldwide, with more than
half of this number being displaced in sub-Saharan Africa. She
asserted that ‘environmental refugees (had) become the single
largest class of displaced persons in the world’. This ﬁgure appears
to be based on the number of people who were internally displaced
– whatever the reason – in the regions identiﬁed by Jacobson. A
similar methodology was used by Westing in 1992: he compared
the number of people being forcibly displaced worldwide, either
internationally or internally, between 1986 (26.4 million people)
and 1992 (41.5 million people). He then speculated that the
increase of internally displaced people (IDPs) could simply be
attributed to additional ﬂows of ‘environmental refugees’ (West-
ing, 1992). If one follows Westing reasoning, this would mean that
there had been 15.1 million people forcibly displaced because of
environmental changes between 1986 and 1992. Those estimates
were made without a serious examination of the cause of
migration and attributed the rise in forced migration to a singly
proxy – environmental changes.
Both El-Hinnawi’s and Jacobson’s reports were received with
great interest by the media and civil society, but attracted harsh
criticism from scholars: they had a ‘short-lived shock-effect on the
public debate but were rejected as unserious by scholars’ (Suhrke,
1993: 6). El-Hinnawi’s report had been commissioned by the UN
Environment Programme, while Jacobson was a senior fellow at
the WorldWatch Institute: the reports were therefore perceived as
an attempt to use forced migration to draw attention to
environmental problems. The estimates they provided proved
instrumental in this endeavour.
The most frequently cited ﬁgure, however, comes from
environmental scientist Norman Myers, who wrote several papers
in the 1990s and early 2000s to alert policy-makers and public
opinion about the ‘growing phenomenon’ represented by ‘envi-
ronmental refugees’ (Myers, 1993, 1997, 2002; Myers and Kent,
1995). All of these papers contained estimates and predictions of
the number of people displaced by environmental change. As the
concept of environmental migration gained currency, they became
the most inﬂuential and controversial ﬁgures discussed in public
debates. To date, they remain the most elaborated estimates of
environmental migration.
Myers deﬁnes ‘environmental refugees’ as people who can no
longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought,
soil erosion, desertiﬁcation, deforestation and other environmental
problems, together with the associated problems of population
pressures and profound poverty (Myers, 2002). Like El-Hinnawi’s
deﬁnition, this one also encompasses both internal and interna-
tional migration, as well as temporary and permanent movement.
Though the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is
not explicitly stated, it appears clearly that the deﬁnition focuses
on displacement rather than mobility. In his most elaborated
report on the subject, Myers – along with his assistant Jennifer
Kent – contended that there were in 1995 25 million people
displaced because of environmental changes (Myers and Kent,
1995). This number appears to be based on a compilation of
different regional or country reports, some of them conducted by
Myers, some by other researchers. Thus the global ﬁgure of 25
million is broken down in different regions:
- 5 million in the Sahel, ‘where a full 10 million had ﬂed from
recent droughts, only half returning home’ (Myers, 2002);
- 7 million in other parts of Africa, seeking relief food; don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people
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million out of China’s 120 million internal migrants ‘could be
characterised as environmental refugees’, because of the
shortage of agricultural plots (Myers, 2002);
- 2 million in Mexican cities – Myers (2002) added that there were
one million new environmental refugees each year in Mexico;
- 1 million people who had been displaced by public works
projects and remained in a refugee-like situation.
Though the addition of these different numbers falls slightly
short of 25 million, Myers contended later that his estimate of 1995
was ‘cautious and conservative’ (Myers, 2002). This estimate
warrants some observations:
- First, the estimate doesn’t describe a ﬂow, but a stock: people
who have been displaced because of environmental factors but
have returned or resettled elsewhere are not included in the
count.
- Second, the estimate does not distinguish between different
types of environmental changes as migration drivers, and
includes development projects amongst these.
- Finally, the estimate is based on other works, whose methodolo-
gies have not been described, but are unlikely to be similar – this
casts serious doubts about the scientiﬁc accuracy of the estimate.
Overall, Myers’ estimate of the number of ‘environmental
refugees’ does not rely on any speciﬁc methodology: for each
region of the world, the number of internally displaced people is
considered. On the basis of these ﬁgures, Myers makes an estimate
of the proportion that could have been displaced because of
environmental disruptions. This estimate is based on reports and
observations of environmental degradation in the considered
region, but no attention is given to an examination of the linkages
between environmental change and migration behaviour. In an
essentialist fashion, Myers assumes that all people displaced in an
area affected by environmental changes have been displaced solely
because of these changes. Another interesting point to consider is
that Myers rules out the possibility that some could have been
displaced outside of their country – international migration is not
considered in his estimate.
Despite these limitations, the ﬁgure of 25 million made a lasting
impact in the public debates, and was picked up in a number of
reports and documents aimed at raising awareness about the
plight of ‘environmental refugees’. Simms and Conisbee, for
example, made ample use of the ﬁgure in an advocacy report
requesting that people displaced by environmental changes be
granted a refugee status (Conisbee and Simms, 2003). The
credibility of the ﬁgure was reinforced after the Red Cross stressed
in its 2001 World Disasters Report that more people were forced to
leave their homes because of environmental disasters than war
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
2001). This claim was based on operational reports from the Red
Cross activities in the ﬁeld. The ﬁgure of 25 million was also quoted
in the famously controversial report of the NGO Christian Aid,
‘‘Human Tide’ (Christian Aid, 2007). In this latest report however,
the ﬁgure is not taken from Myers, but rather from a factsheet
issued in 2006 by UNHCR with regard to internally displaced
people (IDPs). After careful examination of the source, it appears
that the number of 25 million people relates to the number of IDPs
worldwide, and not to the number of people displaced because of
environmental change. It therefore appears that the UNHCR
factsheet has been misquoted in the Christian Aid report.
Notwithstanding this mistake, the report asserts that there are
currently 163 million people forcibly displaced worldwide.
Amongst these people are 25 million displaced by naturalPlease cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011disasters, as stated above, but also 105 million people displaced
by development projects. This ﬁgure is solely based on an
interview with Prof. M. Cernea, a specialist of population
displacements induced by development projects.
Finally, in an interview with the Guardian and a related press
brieﬁng, Prof. J. Bogardi, then Director of the Institute for the
Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University
(UNU-EHS, Bonn), claimed that there were 10 million people
displaced every year because of environmental deterioration
(Adam, 2005). This ﬁgure doesn’t seem related to any empirical
study or statistical information, but appears to be derived from the
projection, made in the same interview, that there would be 50
million ‘environmental refugees’ by 2010. Given that the interview
was made in 2005, one can assume that Prof. Bogardi made the
calculation that 10 million people needed to be displaced every
year in order to reach the number of 50 million by 2010. In any
case, this ﬁgure seems to have been provided for the sole purpose
of feeding the media appetite for numbers.
At this stage, it seems relevant to consider also how the
literature on migration at large has addressed this issue. Piguet
(2009) rightly recalls that environmental conditions were initially
considered as factors that drove people to migrate in the works of
the pioneers of migration studies, before being overshadowed by
economic and political factors and eventually forgotten. Only a
few, more recent works, such as those of Hunter (2005) or Henry
and Piche´ (2004), address environmental migration as part of
broader migration dynamics. Piguet makes the case for the
environment to be ‘re-embedded’ into migration theories and
models. Though it has indeed been little considered in most
migration models, it is worth noting that some authors have
proposed alternative methodologies to measure environmental
migration, some of them directly inspired by demographical or
geographical measurements of migration. Aﬁﬁ and Warner (2008)
proposed to use a gravity model, directly inspired by push–pull
theories of migration. The model integrated different migration
variables, both environmental and non-environmental, such as
land degradation or the occurrence of ﬂoods, but also the distance
between countries or the GDP per capita. The model per se was not
able to produce any estimate or prediction, but controlling for non-
environmental variables allowed the authors to conclude that
environmental factors had a signiﬁcant impact on migration ﬂows
between countries. A major caveat of the model was however that
it applied only to international migration and thus proved short-
lived, since it had long been established that environmental
migration is generally restricted to internal movement (Boano
et al., 2008; Ja¨ger et al., 2009).
Scholars from the University of Sussex have also suggested that
methods borrowed from demographic and geographic studies on
migration could prove insightful for estimating and predicting the
number of people displaced by environmental change, such as
agent-based modelling (Kniveton et al., 2008). Agent-based
modelling is a method that simulates the behaviours and
responses of actors to stimuli, in this case environmental change,
as well as the interactions between these different actors. Though
the method has been sporadically applied in some case-studies, no
global estimate or prediction has been conducted yet.
Finally, estimates on the number of people displaced by
catastrophic events such as natural disasters seem more robust
and less controversial. The latest and most accurate study is the
one released in June 2011 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Center and the Norwegian Refugee Council (Yenotani, 2011). The
study reviews comprehensively the natural hazard-induced
disasters that occurred in 2009 and 2010, and concludes that 17
million people were displaced by such disasters in 2009, and 42
million in 2010, most of them in Asia. These numbers have not
attracted controversy so far, and rely on a simple, four-pronged don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people
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EM-DAT database.2 Then some events are prioritised – those where
more than 50,000 people were affected – in order to create a core
dataset. For each event, data is collected from various and
organisations about the number of displaced people. An estimate
of total displacement is then made for each event, and the numbers
are analysed.
Other estimates of people displaced by natural disasters have
also been conducted in the past by various organisations, including
the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or the UN
Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These
reports have been relatively consensual, as they all rely on a similar
methodology – indeed, the key methodological challenges and
caveats lie with slow-onset environmental changes.
3. Predictions and forecasts of future migration ﬂows
Many of the authors who had provided estimates of current and
past numbers of people displaced by environmental change also
provided forecasts for future displacements, at different time
horizons. Most of the predictions were affected by the same ﬂaws
and biases as were current estimates: a weak or inexistent
methodology, and a tendency to use the numbers in order to raise
awareness.
In line with his current estimate, El-Hinnawi warned that ‘this
number (would) increase with deteriorating environmental and
economic conditions in parts of the developing world’ (Milan,
2004). One can therefore assume that the predictions also
incorporate, at least partly, people displaced because of economic
conditions. In 1989, UNEP Executive Director Mostafa K. Tolba
echoed these ﬁgures, and warned that ‘as many as 50 million
people could become environmental refugees’ by 2010 (Tolba,
1989). The forecast was also reinstated later by then UNEP
Executive Director Klaus To¨pfer3 in numerous statements and
interviews, which gave the ﬁgure a certain prominence in public
debates over the issue. In early 2011, different blogs and internet
websites noted that the ‘50 million refugees’ had failed to
materialise, which gave rise to a controversy documented in an
article by The New Scientist (Pearce, 2011). But even more than the
ﬁgure of 50 million, it is a forecast of 150 million people displaced
by 2050 that captured the public’s attention.
The ﬁgure was mentioned by Myers, outlining the methodology
that allowed him to come up with the forecast (Myers and Kent,
1995; Myers, 2002). Myers also cited El-Hinnawi’s and UNEP’s
estimates, though it is not clear whether he used these numbers
and added a methodological apparatus or whether he used El-
Hinnawi’s methodology and came up with the same conclusions.
In any case, Myers contended that the rise was mostly the result of
three concomitant and interrelated factors: environmental decline,
spreading poverty and demographic expansion (Myers, 2002).
According to Myers, the two latter problems were directly related
to the ﬁrst one. It appears therefore that the projections forecast
not only the people who would be displaced solely because of
environmental changes, but also the people displaced for other
reasons, though these reasons would be linked to environmental
factors. The rise from 25 million ‘environmental refugees’ in 1995
to 50 million in 2010 can easily be explained by the fact that such
displacements started in 1980, according to Myers. He concludes
that at least the same number of people would be displaced
between 1995 and 2010 than between 1980 and 1995. The forecast
of 150 million displacees by 2050 takes into account the
demographic expansion of developing countries as well as the2 The EM-DAT database, hosted in the University of Louvain (Belgium), is widely
considered as the most comprehensive public database of natural disasters.
3 Mr To¨pfer’s term as Executive Director of UNEP was 1998–2006.
Please cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011deteriorating environmental conditions. Amongst these, Myers
considers principally sea-level rise and desertiﬁcation. His forecast
is based on the number of people that are expected to live in the
regions at risk by 2050: in a deterministic manner, Myers assumes
that all these people will be forced to leave.
Contrary to a widely held belief, this ﬁgure has never been
reproduced in the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has been picked up, however, in
another report on climate change that received high media
exposure: the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
(Stern, 2007). The review, however, notes cautiously that ‘the
estimate has not been rigorously tested, but it remains in line with
the evidence presented throughout this chapter that climate
change will lead to hundreds of millions more people without
sufﬁcient water or food to survive or threatened by dangerous
ﬂoods and increased disease’.
In a subsequent paper, Myers updated his 2050 prediction, and
warned that when global warming takes hold, ‘there could be as
many as 200 million people4 overtaken by sea-level rise and
coastal ﬂooding, by disruption of monsoon systems and other
rainfall regimes, and by droughts of unprecedented severity and
duration’ (Myers, 2002). The people at risk of ﬂooding would be
distributed as follows:
- Bangladesh: 26 million
- Egypt: 12 million
- China: 73 million
- India: 20 million
- Other parts of the world, including small island states: 31 million.
In addition to these 162 million people, Myers warns that at
least 50 million are at risk because of droughts and other climate
dislocations.
Through frequent repetitions, and despite its highly speculative
nature and questionable scientiﬁc accuracy, this latest ﬁgure of 200
million people displaced by 2050 has been taken as empirical
evidence, and has been frequently cited in media reports and other
studies. Such reports and studies include works and communica-
tions by the UNU-EHS (Renaud et al., 2007), Friends of the Earth
(Friends of the Earth Australia, 2007) or the Geneva-based Global
Humanitarian Forum (Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009). These
works garnered large attention, especially in the run-up to the
2009 Copenhagen Conference, contributing to the spreading of the
forecast in public debates.
Myers can certainly be credited with drawing worldwide attention
to the topic of environmental migration. However, his work is largely
based on speculative common sense rather than on actual ﬁgures and
estimates – a point that has been vigorously criticised by many
scholars, including Black (2001) and Castles (2002).
Another highly controversial estimate came from the above-
mentioned Christian Aid report (Christian Aid, 2007), which
predicted that as many as one billion people could be forcibly
displaced by 2050. Out of these 1 billion people, the report
predicted that 300 million would be directly displaced as a result
of environmental disruptions:
- 50 million people displaced by natural disasters, at a rate of 1
million people displaced per year;
- 250 million people permanently displaced because of climate-
change related phenomena such as droughts, famines, ﬂoods and
hurricanes.
This last ﬁgure is based on an interview with Prof. N. Myers,
reﬂecting upon his previous estimates. In addition, the report
mentions that 645 million people will be displaced as a result of4 Bold fonts were added by the author of this review.
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that ‘without urgent action, climate change will make the forced
displacement crisis the biggest threat facing developing countries
over the next 50 years’. The report by Christian Aid attracted
considerable media attention, but was harshly rebuffed by the
scholarly community as unserious and overly alarmist.
Biermann and Boas (2010) also sought to predict the numbers
and origins of ‘climate refugees’, recognising that ‘all current
predictions are fraught with numerous methodological problems
and caveats’. In order to circumvent these difﬁculties, they attempt
to distinguish the number of people affected by different climate
impacts (extreme weather events, sea-level rise, drought and
water stress) in different regions of the world. In order to do this,
they use different studies assessing the number of people at risk of
these impacts, and conclude prudently that ‘the total number of
people at risk of becoming climate refugees by 2050 could well be
around or over 200 million (. . .)’. A key caveat of this assessment,
though the authors admit it’s only a rough estimate, is that it is
based on secondary sources – including the works of Myers –
whose methodologies are not consistent with each other. Despite
this caveat, the paper appears more robust than its predecessors,
because it attempts to break down this global 200 million ﬁgure by
regions and climate change impacts. In particular, the authors
calculated the number of people who would be affected each year
by 2080s by storm surges with a sea-level rise of about 38 cm in
different regions. Though this sea-level rise could be disputed for
being underestimated (Rahmstorf, 2010), they came up with the
ﬁgure of 82 million people affected in Africa, 141 million for Asia,
and 2.5 million for small island states. Interestingly, they departed
from the often-assumed deterministic perspective and calculated
how these numbers could be reduced thanks to evolving
protection mechanisms. In that case, the numbers would 14
million for Africa, 76 million for Asia and 1.2 million for small
island states. For each continent, they provided examples of
estimated displacement induced by sea-level rise, including 12
million ‘climate refugees’ in Egypt, 26 million in Bangladesh, 73
million in China and 20 million in India, all by the year 2050. They
repeated the exercise with other climate impacts such as tropical
cyclones and water stress, but provided ﬁgures that were
considerably less detailed. For example, people at risk of water
stress in Africa by 2085 due to a temperature increase of 2–3 8C,
depending on population level, were estimated to be between 197
million and 1.65 billion – an eightfold variation.
More recently, a number of studies of studies discussed the
possible effects of climate change in the event when temperature
increase would reach 4 8C+ by the end of the century. In that case,
Nicholls et al. (2011) stated that up to 187 million people could be
forcibly displaced because of sea-level rise over the century. This
ﬁgure is characterised by an excessive deterministic bias, as the it
reﬂects the number of people at risk of coastal ﬂooding but does
not take into account other factors that will weigh upon migration
behaviours, such as adaptation strategies or poverty.Table 1
Estimates and forecasts of the number of people displaced by environmental changes.
Source Estimates at the time of public
UNEP (Tolba, 1989; Milan, 2004) 30 million 
Jacobson (1988) 10 million 
Myers (1993, 2002) 25 million 
Myers and Kent (1995) 25 million 
Red Cross (2001) More than people displaced by
UNU-EHS (Adam 2005; Renaud et al., 2007) 10 million/year 
Stern (2007) – 
Christian Aid (2007) 25 million 
Biermann and Boas (2010) – 
Please cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011Figures that forecast the number of people who could be at risk
because of the adverse effects of climate change but did not discuss
their eventual displacement proved far less controversial. Nicholls
predicted that up to 30 million people a year could be at risk of
coastal ﬂooding because of sea-level rise by 2080 (Nicholls, 2004),
while the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertiﬁcation (UNCCD) warned that 135 million people were at
risk of being displaced because of desertiﬁcation by 2030, with 60
million people expected to move from sub-Saharan Africa to
Northern Africa and Europe (United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertiﬁcation, 2010).
These different forecasts share some common characteristics: in
particular, they were received with great scepticism in the scholarly
community, and great interest in the media and policy-making
community. Thus, at the same time that they were facing harsh
criticism, they also made a signiﬁcant impact in public debates, as
whistle-blowers of an upcoming humanitarian catastrophe. The
media appetite for numbers is well known: ‘startling statistics shape
our thinking about social issues’ and deﬁne the importance and
seriousness of these issues (Best, 2001). Forecasts of ‘environmental
refugees’ perfectly ﬁt that bill, and indicated an issue of tremendous
magnitude and importance. Doing so, they also shaped how the
public and policy-makers would think about the issue.
Most of these forecasts were published in the grey literature,
which might explain why little attention was devoted to
methodological issues. Only a few reports were published in
academic journals, meaning that the methodology of most works
was never reviewed externally.
Finally, most forecasts use the same timeframes for the
estimates and predictions: 2010 and 2050. The choice of these
timeframes has been heavily inﬂuenced by the timeframes used by
the IPCC for its Assessment Reports – and indeed, the forecasts
depend heavily upon climate change projections. We are now in
2011, one year after the year that was usually chosen as the ﬁrst
year of reference for the forecasts. Thus it would seem relatively
easy to check the validity of these forecasts against reality.
Unfortunately, in the absence of any statistical information, it is
currently impossible to assess the accuracy of these predictions
against empirical realities. Furthermore, the absence of a
consensual deﬁnition of ‘environmental migration’ means that
different numbers can refer to different realities – this deﬁnitional
problem will be addressed in the next section.
Table 1 synthesises the principal and comparable ﬁgures
provided in the different estimates and forecasts.
4. Difﬁculties and obstacles
Predictions and estimates remain one of the most contentious
issues in public debates on environmental migration. Many
scholars suspect that these ﬁgures lack any empirical basis, and
are put forward with the sole purpose of raising awareness and
garnering media attention around the issue of climate change, oration of the report Predictions by 2010 Predictions by 2050
50 million –
– –
– 150, then 200 million
50 million 212 million
 war – –
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as they are often requested by policy-makers in order to assess the
importance of the phenomenon and develop policy responses. The
role of science and statistics in the policy process has been widely
documented in the literature (Sabatier, 1987; Majone, 1989).
Predictions and estimates have been abundantly used to advocate
for the development of new policies and mechanisms of protection
to assist the people displaced by environmental changes. Yet
whereas back-of-the-envelope ﬁgure can sufﬁce to generate public
awareness, the design and funding of appropriate policy responses
will often require more detailed and robust ﬁgures.
Despite their ﬂaws and biases, predictions and estimates made
a lasting impact in both policy and scholarly debates: they are now
often quoted as scientiﬁc truth, without any questioning of the
methodology used. The multi-causality of displacement, as well as
the confusion between forced and voluntary migration, make it
difﬁcult to identify a precise and rigorous number of environmen-
tally displaced persons. Given the lack of comprehensive
methodology and empirical studies, the ﬁeld is wide open for
guesses and doom-laden estimates rather than actual numbers.
Different factors impede upon the collection and development
of accurate data and forecasts. Some of these factors are common
to all displacement-related issues; others are speciﬁc to environ-
mental migration.
First, the quest for numbers is hampered by the debates on
controversies over the concept and very deﬁnition of environmen-
tal migration. Without clear deﬁnition, providing accurate data
seems a daunting task. As noted by Biermann and Boas (2010), ‘all
studies operate with different terminology and deﬁnitions, which
makes it difﬁcult to compare results’. Different problems impede
upon the search for a common deﬁnition, including tensions
between scholars who would like to establish ‘environmental
migration’ as a distinct migration category and scholars who insist
on the multi-causality of migration, as well as tensions between
international agencies over the perimeter of their respective
mandates (Dun and Gemenne, 2008). It is worth noting, however,
that a similar problem is encountered when counting refugees,
even though a legal deﬁnition exists. In the words of Crisp, ‘any
form of enumeration exercise must be based upon a clearly deﬁned
unit of measurement if it is to produce reliable, usable and
comparable data. In the case of refugee statistics, however, such
clarity does not always exist’ (1999).
Most of displacements triggered by environmental factors are
intra-national, rather than international. This poses a further
statistical problem, since counting internal movements is much
more difﬁcult than cross-border movements: ‘the machinery to
collect data on these movements simply does not yet exist’ (Brown,
2008). Crisp provides a list of questions that are left unanswered
when one is attempting to count internally displaced people (IDPs):
In the absence of a clear criterion such as the crossing of an
international border, how far does a person have to move to be
considered ‘internally displaced’? When do internally (dis-
placed) people cease to warrant that status: when they return
to their original place of residence, or when they have achieved
a certain degree of physical and socio-economic security in the
place to which they have ﬂed? Given that a large proportion of
the world’s IDPs are thought to live in towns and cities, how can
they be differentiated from other rural-to-urban migrants?
(1999)
Some further problems are speciﬁc to the nature of environ-
mental migration. When it comes to predictions, ﬁgures are
usually based on the number of people living in regions at risk, and
not on the number of people actually expected to migrate.
Estimates do not account for adaptation strategies, nor differentPlease cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011levels of vulnerability to change. This confusion between the
number of people living in affected regions and the number of
migrants is rooted in a deterministic perspective, and is a key
reason for the inﬂation of numbers.
Predictions also need to take into account demographic changes
that are expected to occur over the next decades. Whereas the
global population growth can be predicted to a certain extent, its
geographic distribution remains uncertain. In recent years,
migration to urban areas has accelerated. An increasing number
of people live in regions highly exposed to natural risks and
hazards, resulting in an increased number of disasters. These
demographic shifts are particularly signiﬁcant in developing
countries, and they make estimates of potential migrants a
difﬁcult task.
Also, it is expected that a large number of future displacements
will be induced by the impacts of climate change. It is possible to
mitigate these impacts through adaptation strategies, and to
mitigate climate change itself by reducing our greenhouse gas
emissions. Thus the future impacts of climate change on societies
will greatly depend on future levels of greenhouse gas emissions,
as well as on the adaptation strategies that will be implemented in
vulnerable regions. Some impacts can be avoided through
signiﬁcant emissions cuts, while adaptation strategies can help
populations cope with the impacts that cannot be avoided. In a
nutshell, future displacements depend to a large extent upon the
climate policies that are implemented today. Because of the inertia
of the climate system, the impacts of global warming until 2050 are
largely pre-determined by our past emissions (Hansen et al., 2006).
Impacts beyond 2050 depend heavily on our current emissions,
and this is the reason why only few predictions go beyond 2050.
Though the impacts of climate change until 2050 are largely
known, thanks to the IPCC reports, adaptation strategies can
minimise how these impact affect societies. Hence future
displacements also depend, to a great extent, upon the adaptation
strategies that are implemented today – and pro-active migration
might actually be part of them. Overall, public policies play a great
role in shaping migration dynamics (Zolberg, 1989). With regard to
environmental changes, they might encourage or deter movement,
or provide adaptation schemes that will sustain people’s liveli-
hoods in their region of origin. Yet the role of public policies – be
they environmental or migration policies, or both – is often
unaccounted for in the estimates and forecasts.
Finally, the importance of timeframes is of crucial importance:
do the predicted numbers describe an accumulation of migration
ﬂows over a certain period of time, or do they account for a stock of
environmental migrants at a certain period of time? Are those who
have been able to return home included in the predictions or not?
Though these questions are of crucial importance, they are rarely
addressed and fuel the suspicion that the numbers are artiﬁcially
inﬂated.
Despite these difﬁculties, getting the numbers rights is an
important step for developing adequate policies. The programming
of assistance and mobilisation of resources, including funding,
depends on accurate numbers (Crisp, 1999). In the absence of
reliable statistics, numbers can be easily inﬂated and manipulated,
in order to attract attention on some populations, sometimes at the
expense of other populations in need of protection.
5. Ways forward
In order to move forward, three different avenues could be
explored. First, a right framework for research needs to be set. This
implies the design of a common working deﬁnition, as well as the
development of statistical systems and local research capacities.
Second, quantitative research in the ﬁeld needs to be rescaled, both
with regard to their timeframe and their spatial dimension. Third don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people
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longitudinal studies, scenarios, or agent-based modelling. The
following paragraphs detail a few suggestions along these three
avenues, which could pave the way towards more accurate
estimates and projections.
5.1. Setting the right framework for research
First, the deﬁnitional issue seems paramount. As pointed by
Suhrke, ‘broad categorizations invite large numbers’ (Suhrke,
1993): many ﬁgures rely on very broad, loosed deﬁnition of
‘environmental migration’, in order to encompass as many people
as possible. International organisations and agencies also use
different deﬁnitions and terminologies, reﬂecting the perimeter of
their mandate. These different deﬁnitions and typologies make
estimates and projections hardly comparable, and any attempt to
come up with more robust ﬁgures will be hampered by this
deﬁnitional issue. A high-level group comprised of scholars and
representatives from international organisations could be tasked
with providing a working deﬁnition and typology that would
become a referential. The deﬁnition would need to distinguish
between forced and voluntary movement, as current ﬁgures often
confuse these two types of migration, though they reﬂect reactions
to environmental changes that are fundamentally different from
each other. Though the line between forced and voluntary
migration has become increasingly blurred in recent years and
both can hardly be deﬁned as clear-cut categories (Hugo, 1996),
ﬁgures should state more clearly whether they consider forced or
voluntary movements, or both. A common typology would be most
helpful for this.
Statistical systems also need to be further developed. Many
developing countries simply don’t have the capacity to monitor
migration ﬂows, especially within their own borders. The
development of country proﬁles could be a ﬁrst step in this
endeavour, which will require signiﬁcant resources and capacity-
building. The inclusion of questions related to the perception of
environmental changes and internal mobility in national surveys
and census would another major step in this direction.
Research on environmental migration is mostly conducted from
industrialised countries. Yet most of these movements take place
in developing countries, where local expertise is insufﬁciently
mobilised. Too many estimates and predictions are produced
without any supporting evidence from empirical studies. Quanti-
tative research needs to be complemented with and tested against
qualitative research, and local research capacities urgently need to
be developed. The setting up of local observatories, for example,
could provide a monitoring of environmental migration in the
long-run.
5.2. Rescaling estimates and predictions
Despite a few exceptions, estimates and predictions tend to be
produced on the global level. As a result, they often have little
policy relevance, as they aggregate different types of movement,
requiring different types of policy intervention. Boano et al.
suggest that, instead of drafting global estimates, ‘a more valuable
route to understanding the potential scale of displacement, and
thus the scope of policy intervention’, would consist in getting a
more nuanced understanding of the different forms of environ-
mental migration, and developing a much more empirically
grounded approach to the issue (2008). They suggest that research
should focus on the identiﬁcation and mapping of potential
environmental ‘hotspots’, the monitoring of changing conditions,
the examination of ‘tipping points’ and the tracking of migration
trends. Kniveton et al. concur that a ﬁrst step is to ‘try to
understand how people cope with the different types of gradualPlease cite this article in press as: Gemenne, F., Why the numbers
displaced by environmental changes. Global Environ. Change (2011stresses and sudden shocks brought about by climate change and
variability’ (2008). As a matter of fact, the most robust quantitative
studies so far were conducted on the local or national level. They
include the works of Massey et al. in Nepal (2007) or the works of
Henry et al. in Burkina Faso (2003; 2004). Studies that focus on the
local level allow for a crisper understanding of migration behaviour
and a more accurate measurement of migration trends. In the
current state of our understanding of environmental migration, it
is probably impossible to provide a reliable and accurate global
estimate.
Another scaling issue concerns the timeframe of estimates and
predictions, which is often unclear: for example, when one states
that there will be 150 million ‘environmental refugees’ by 2050,
does that mean that 150 million people will be displaced between
now and 2050, or that 150 million people will be displaced in the
year 2050? What about the migrants who will return to their place
of origin? Does one speak about permanent or temporary
migration? More clarity is needed with regard to the timescales
that are used.
Finally, another rescaling effort is needed with regard to the
expected magnitude of climate change. Most forecasts are based on
the assumption that global warming will be limited to 2 8C over the
course of the century, which is the ofﬁcial objective adopted during
the Copenhagen and Cancu´n conferences, in 2009 and 2010
respectively. Yet many scientists and observers believe that this
objective will not be achieved, and that average global temperature
increase is likely to be around 4 8C by the end of the century (Betts
et al., 2011). A 4 8C temperature rise could increase migration ﬂows
in some places, but could also limit migration possibilities for some
populations (Gemenne, 2011). Predictions should be rescaled in
order to account for the possibility of a 4 8C temperature rise by the
end of the century, which appears as a possibility that ought to be
considered seriously, given the current commitments to reduced
greenhouse gas emissions. Predictions also tend to confuse the
movements that could be induced by climate change impacts and
other environmental disruptions such as natural disasters. More
effort should be made in order to identify the additional migration
volumes that can be attributed to different types of environmental
changes: this would allow to assess the relative weight of global
warming on migration trends over time.
5.3. Exploring new methods
Piguet has conducted a useful review of the different methods
that could be used in order to measure environmental migration
(2010). While some methods tend to be frequently used, others
have been little explored, despite promising prospects.
Kniveton et al. (2008) suggest that agent-based modelling
should be used to simulate future migration patterns on the basis
of current migration behaviours. An agent-based model is a
computational model that simulates the behaviours of agents in
reaction to some stimuli. The model has been successfully used to
study migration trends, but has not yet been applied to
environmental migration. Though the method remains quite
controversial, it could provide valuable insights for the prediction
of future ﬂows of environmental migration.
Multi-level analysis has been little used as well, though this
method is widely recognised as one of the most robust methods, as
it combines different methods on different levels, including
household surveys and time series. This allows for the monitoring
of migration trends over longer periods of time: current studies of
environmental migration are usually snapshots that fail to capture
long-term migration dynamics. As environmental changes are
often incremental over time, it is essential to track migration
trends over longer periods of time. Multi-level analysis should thus
be used more frequently than it has been so far, whenever possible. don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people
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Burkina Faso (2003; 2004), which tracked the migration beha-
viours of thousands of households over several years and cross-
checked them against longitudinal environmental data.
Finally, the speculative character of predictions needs to be
acknowledged. A way to remedy this problem is to resort to
different possible evolution scenarios.
The EACH-FOR project (‘Environmental Changes and Forced
Migration Scenarios’, www.each-for.eu) developed such a model-
ling exercise, based on scenarios relating to different policy
directions (Ja¨ger et al., 2009). The exercise provides some ways
forward in order to take into account the different variables that
will impact upon the number of people displaced by environmen-
tal changes. However, in order to provide robust scenarios, one
needs to be provided with consistent statistical indicators, which
are absent in most developing countries. The EACH-FOR scenarios
were only realised for a limited number of countries, and without
robust quantitative data. In that sense, they need to be recognised
as a methodological exercise rather than an accurate projection of
the people who could be displaced by environmental change. They
highlight, however, the need to better take into account the role of
public policies as a determining condition of the nature and
magnitude of future displacements and migration. As mentioned
earlier, most forecasts and predictions ignore completely the role
of public policies in the generation of environmental migration.
6. Conclusion
As they stand today, estimates and predictions regarding
environmental displacement are not satisfactory. Many of them
appear to have been put forward in order to generate media
attention rather than to provide empirically grounded estimates
and predictions. In particular, they lack robust methodological
foundations, and are generally grounded in a deterministic
perspective, assuming that all people impacted by environmental
changes will move away from their homes. Furthermore, they are
strongly biased towards climate change, often at the expense of
other environmental changes. Overall, it seems that a key
methodological debate relies on the relative weight of environ-
mental factors amongst the various drivers of migration. Since
early on, scholars have been divided between minimalists and
maximalists (Suhrke, 1994), the latter assuming that environmen-
tal change is a major driver of migration and displacement,
whereas the former tend to insist on the multi-causality of
migration. As of today, this debate remains extremely ﬁerce.
Yet it seems difﬁcult, at the moment, to provide more accurate
data. Many developing countries lack the statistical capacity to
monitor migration movements. In the absence of commonly
agreed deﬁnition, robust empirical studies and a statistical
apparatus, it seems difﬁcult to envision how accurate data could
be provided. This doesn’t mean however that we should abandon
the idea of building quantitative data, as these are of central
importance for the development of policy responses. Current
estimates and forecasts need to be rescaled on different levels, and
innovative methods such as scenarios, multi-level analysis or
agent-based modelling can provide some interesting ways
forward. This will require however that the current quest for
global ﬁgures is abandoned, in order to make way for more focused
studies, as these could provide numbers that would be policy-
relevant and yet scientiﬁcally sound.
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